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Abstract
This paper introduces history-dependent preferences into the principal-agent framework.
In this setup, the Inverse Euler equation breaks down. The paper characterizes optimal
contracts and shows that the wedge between the principal’s rate of return to saving and
the agent’s shadow rate of return is not positive in general. However, the wedge is positive
given a rather weak assumption on the agent’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.
This points out an intimate link between the sign of the wedge and regressive/progressive
taxation of wealth. Finally, the paper explores diﬀerences between the two most common
models of history-dependent preferences.
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11 Introduction
The Inverse Euler equation, initially discovered by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson
(1985), recently generalized by Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), is arguably one
of the most important ﬁndings in the dynamic contracting literature. The equation is based
on the central observation that the agent’s utilities can be intertemporally adjusted without
changing the incentives to exert eﬀort. As a consequence, the principal’s marginal costs of
providing utility today must be equal to the conditional expected marginal costs of providing
utility tomorrow. For history-independent preferences, the marginal costs of providing utility
are given by the agent’s inverse marginal utility of consumption. The Inverse Euler equation is
therefore an immediate consequence of the previous observation.
However, the Inverse Euler equation requires a strong assumption regarding the agent’s pref-
erences as the above argument shows. The present paper introduces a more general preference
class into the principal-agent framework. Following similar ideas in the asset pricing litera-
ture, the agent’s preferences are allowed to be history-dependent. More precisely, the agent’s
second-period consumption utility may be a function of both the ﬁrst and second period level of
consumption. Similarly, the agent’s second-period eﬀort disutility may depend on both the ﬁrst
and second period level of eﬀort. In this setup, the simple link between the principal’s marginal
costs of providing utility and the agent’s inverse marginal utility of consumption breaks down
and thus the Inverse Euler equation does not longer apply. The goal of this paper is to char-
acterize optimal contracts in this environment and study the robustness of the lessons drawn
from the Inverse Euler equation. This task is important not only from a theoretical point of
view, but also from a more applied perspective, considering that history-independent prefer-
ences might be too narrow to describe and predict economic behavior (Helson 1964, Frederick
and Loewenstein 1999).
I derive two key properties of optimal contracts for history-dependent preferences. First, by
a simple extension of Rogerson’s (1985) argument, I show that the marginal costs of increasing
the agent’s utility are still constant over time. This yields an intertemporal condition that is
related to the Inverse Euler equation, but includes eﬀects of current wages on future preferences.
In a second step, I explore how saving distorts the incentive problem. In models with history-
independent preferences, the Inverse Euler equation implies that optimal contracts feature a
2positive intertemporal wedge: The principal’s rate of return to saving exceeds the shadow rate
of return associated with the agent’s consumption scheme. Therefore, the agent would choose
to save if he had access to the same savings technology as the principal. In the present setup,
by contrast, the intertemporal wedge can be positive or negative. This implies that the agent’s
access to the savings technology must be distorted too. However, it is possible that the crucial
problem is that of borrowing, rather than saving.
To understand this result, note how saving changes the agent’s future incentives to exert
eﬀort. First of all, saving generates a future payoﬀ. Due to concavity, the marginal utility
of this payoﬀ is high whenever future consumption is low. By this means, saving increases
the relative attractiveness of the states in which the agent is poor. For history-dependent
preferences, this wealth eﬀect of saving is complemented by a second eﬀect: Saving reduces
the agent’s consumption habit. Without imposing any structure on the latter, the eﬀect of
saving on the attractiveness of states with low consumption is ambiguous. As a consequence,
the intertemporal distortion can go both ways.
However, I show that negative intertemporal wedges are not generic. The intertemporal
wedge is positive if the agent’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is increasing in
future consumption. Put diﬀerently, this condition states that the agent’s willingness to give
up future consumption is increasing in the level of future consumption. Hence it is not history-
independent utility, but more generally the variation of the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution that yields positive wedges.
In addition to these general insights on intertemporal optimality, I discuss the two most
common speciﬁcations of history-dependent preferences in more detail. Both speciﬁcations as-
sume that the agent’s second-period consumption utility is decreasing in ﬁrst-period consump-
tion. This assumption is often referred to as habit formation. For the additive formulation
of habit formation (e.g. Constantinides 1990), the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
increases in future consumption. Therefore, optimal contracts feature a positive intertempo-
ral wedge, analogous to the time-separable model. An important diﬀerence compared to the
time-separable model is the increased intertemporal slope of optimal wage schemes. For the
multiplicative speciﬁcation of habit formation (e.g. Abel 1990), the intertemporal wedge is not
positive in general. If the agent’s degree of risk aversion is suﬃciently small compared to the
3importance of habits, then the intertemporal wedge becomes negative in that model.1
This paper is not the ﬁrst to argue that an individual’s preferences may be sharply inﬂuenced
by the personal history. Earlier theoretical works on history-dependent preferences include Ry-
der and Heal (1973), Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
among others. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) review the substantial body of empirical re-
search supporting this approach. For instance, workers’ self-reported well-being is often strongly
related to recent changes in pay, but not so much to absolute levels of pay (Clark 1999, Grund
and Sliwka 2007). More generally, the psychological literature documents that the repetition
of any stimulus tends to reduce the perception and response to it (Helson 1964). Interpreting
consumption as a stimulus, this suggests that past consumption has an important (negative)
inﬂuence on current well-being.
Models with history-dependent preferences have contributed to the solution of empirical
puzzles related to consumption behavior (excess sensitivity puzzle, excess smoothness puzzle),
asset pricing (equity premium puzzle) and the relationship between savings and growth; see
Messinis (1999) for a review. The present paper studies the impact of such preferences on
principal-agent problems. To the best of my knowledge, this question has not been explored so
far.
In a simultaneous paper, Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2008) study a multi-period hidden
information problem with preferences that are not time-separable. They consider a dynam-
ically evolving idiosyncratic skill process instead of a moral hazard environment. The basic
intertemporal properties of optimal allocations are similar in the two settings, however. The
focus of Grochulski and Kocherlakota’s work greatly diﬀers from the present one. Their aim is
to construct a tax system that decentralizes optimal allocations. They show that taxes on cur-
rent wealth need to depend on future labor incomes, which contrasts with the results obtained
for standard preferences (Kocherlakota 2005). By considering a two-period model, I abstract
from this ﬁnding. The central contribution of my paper is the precise characterization of the
intertemporal wedge. The results provide a close link between positivity of the intertemporal
wedge and regressivity of wealth taxes akin to Kocherlakota (2005). In such tax systems, given
a skill realization in the ﬁrst-period, the tax rate on wealth brought into the second period is a
1I also investigated how wages depend on the habit parameter under multiplicative habits. However, in
contrast to the additive model, the comparative statics were not analytically tractable.
4negatively-sloped aﬃne transformation of the agent’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitu-
tion. My ﬁndings imply that if the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution increases with
second-period consumption, then the intertemporal wedge will be positive. Hence, regressive tax
rates on wealth cannot be associated with negative intertemporal wedges. A similar argument
shows that progressive tax rates on wealth cannot be associated with positive intertemporal
wedges.
The present paper can also be seen as a complement to the literature on eﬀort persistence,
which extends the Rogerson (1985) model by allowing for a technology that is not time-separable;
see Mukoyama and Sahin (2005), Kwon (2006), Jarque (2008), and Hopenhayn and Jarque
(2009). In that setup, the Inverse Euler equation is not aﬀected. Hence, eﬀort persistence
and history-dependent preferences have fundamentally diﬀerent eﬀects on the shape of optimal
contracts. The reason is that eﬀort persistence alters the information structure of the model,
but leaves the preference structure unchanged.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 provides
a general characterization of intertemporal optimality. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 explore two speciﬁc
forms of history-dependent preferences. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
I study a two-period moral hazard problem in which the agent’s preferences are history-dependent:
Second-period consumption utility may depend on consumption in both periods. Similarly,
second-period eﬀort disutility may depend on eﬀort in both periods. This setup generalizes the
time-separable model introduced by Rogerson (1985).
2.1 Preferences
The relationship between principal (P) and agent (A) lasts for two periods. The principal
maximizes expected proﬁts. She has access to a linear savings technology at the rate R2, thus
her discount factor equals 1/R2.
The agent has von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and maximizes the expected value of
u1(c1) − v1(e1) + β(u2(c2,c1) − v2(e2,e1)),
5where ct denotes consumption, et represents eﬀort, and β ∈ (0,1] is the discount factor. The
functions u1,u2,v1,v2 are twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Eﬀort disutility vt is strictly in-
creasing and weakly convex in et. Consumption utility ut is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in ct. In addition, I impose two restrictions on the relationship between u2 and c1.
First, A’s lifetime consumption utility is strictly increasing in c1: u′
1 + β∂c1u2 > 0.2 Second,
to rule out boundary solutions, I suppose limc1→0 (u′(c1) + β∂c1u2(c2,c1)) = ∞ for all c2 > 0.
The agent cannot save or borrow, hence his consumption equals his wage in each period.
I call A’s preferences history-independent (or time-separable) if u2 does not depend on
c1 and v2 does not depend on e1. Otherwise, I call A’s preferences history-dependent. In
the latter case, I will refer to c1 and e1 as A’s second-period habit level of consumption and
eﬀort, respectively.
2.2 Technology
In each period, A exerts a hidden work eﬀort and thereby generates a publicly observable
stochastic output. Output realizations for period 1 are denoted x1(i), i = 1,...,N, with
associated probabilities πi(e1) > 0. Second-period output realizations are denoted x2(j), j =
1,...,N, with associated probabilities πj(e2) > 0.3
2.3 Contracts
A contract is a speciﬁcation (w,e) of wages w = (w1(i),w2(i,j))i,j and eﬀort levels e =
(e1,e2(i))i. Here, e1 is the recommended eﬀort for period 1, e2(i) the recommended eﬀort for
period 2 given that x1(i) has realized in period 1. Similarly, w1(i) is the wage paid in period 1,
w2(i,j) is the wage paid in period 2, given that outputs (x1(i),x2(j)) have realized.
P oﬀers a contract at the beginning of period 1. She has to respect A’s participation
constraint
 
i,j
πi(e1)πj(e2(i))
 
u1(w1(i)) − v1(e1) + β [u2(w2(i,j),w1(i)) − v2(e2(i),e1)]
 
≥ U. (PC)
In addition, since eﬀort is not observed by P, contracts must satisfy the incentive compatibility
2Of course, since u2 is strictly increasing in c2, A’s lifetime utility is also strictly increasing in c2.
3I could easily allow for a production technology that is not separable over time, but this would not add any
interesting insights here.
6constraint
e ∈ argmax
(e′
1,e′
2(i))
 
i,j
πi(e′
1)πj(e′
2(i))
 
u1(w1(i)) − v1(e′
1) + β
 
u2(w2(i,j),w1(i)) − v2(e′
2(i),e′
1)
  
.
(IC)
A contract (w,e) is called optimal if it maximizes P’s expected proﬁts
 
i,j
πi(e1)πj(e2(i))
 
x1(i) − w1(i) +
1
R2
[x2(j) − w2(i,j)]
 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) and the participation constraint (PC).
3 General results on intertemporal optimality
To simplify notation, I denote expectations conditional on ﬁrst-period information x1(i) by
Ei[ ] in this section. For example, I write
 
j
πj(e2(i))
∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
= Ei
 
1
∂c2u2
 
,
and so on.
3.1 Modiﬁcation of the Inverse Euler equation
The principal can divide wages over time in the following way: The total reward for good
performance in period 1 need not be given immediately, but may also be included in second-
period wages (which makes the second-period wages dependent on the ﬁrst-period output). If
at least one of the parties is risk-averse, as in the model considered here, then it is clearly
beneﬁcial to make use of this option.
This reasoning yields the following intertemporal condition.
Proposition 1. Let (w,e) be an optimal contract. Then for all i = 1,...,N
1
βR2
Ei
 
1
∂c2u2
 
=
1
u′
1(w1(i))
 
1 −
1
R2
Ei
 
∂c1u2
∂c2u2
  
. (1)
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of the argument in Rogerson (1985). Let h1( )
7be the inverse of u1( ) and h2( ,c1) be the inverse of u2( ,c1), c1 ﬁxed. For ǫ ∈ R, construct a
wage scheme wǫ from w as follows. Fix an arbitrary ﬁrst-period output x1(i). For this output,
increase date 1 utility by ǫ and reduce date 2 utility by ǫ/β. Formally, set
wǫ
1(k) :=

 
 
w1(k) for k  = i,
h1(u1(w1(i)) + ǫ) for k = i,
(2)
wǫ
2(k,j) :=

 
 
w2(k,j) for k  = i,
h2(u2(w2(i,j),w1(i)) − ǫ/β,wǫ
1(i)) for k = i.
(3)
Notice that the incentive and participation constraints under wǫ and w = w0 coincide. Hence,
a necessary condition for optimality of (w,e) is that expected wage payments are minimal at
ǫ = 0. That is, ǫ = 0 must minimize
h1(u1(w1(i)) + ǫ) +
1
R2
Ei [h2(u2(w2(i,j),w1(i)) − ǫ/β,wǫ
1(i))], (4)
which implies the ﬁrst-order condition
0 =
1
u′
1(w1(i))
+
1
R2
Ei
 
−
1
β ∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
−
∂c1u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
u′
1(w1(i))∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
 
. (5)
Equivalently,
1
βR2
Ei
 
1
∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
 
=
1
u′
1(w1(i))
 
1 −
1
R2
Ei
 
∂c1u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))
  
. (6)
Proposition 1 states that P’s marginal cost of increasing A’s utility conditional on output
x1(i) is constant over time: The cost of increasing u2 by ǫ/β is approximately equal to
ǫ
βR2
Ei
  1
∂c2u2
 
. (7)
The cost of increasing u1 by ǫ while keeping u2 constant is approximately equal to
ǫ
u′
1
−
ǫ
R2u′
1
Ei
 ∂c1u2
∂c2u2
 
, (8)
8where the ﬁrst term denotes the increase of period 1 consumption required to raise u1 by ǫ,
and the second term represents the increase of period 2 consumption needed to keep u2 at the
former level. Equation (1) shows that at any optimal contract these two costs are the same.
If preferences are history-independent, with u1 = u2 = u, then equation (1) collapses to
1
u′(w1(i))
=
1
βR2
Ei
 
1
u′(w2(i,j))
 
. (9)
This well-known result from Rogerson (1985) is often called the Inverse Euler equation. The
relation between inverse marginal utilities described in equation (1) is slightly diﬀerent, thus we
cannot attach the same label here. Yet, equations (1) and (9) have exactly the same interpre-
tation: For any optimal contract, the principal’s marginal costs of providing utility conditional
on a given output in period 1 must be equal across periods.
3.2 The intertemporal wedge
In dynamic models with hidden eﬀort choices, there is typically an intertemporal distortion
due to the inﬂuence of savings on the incentive problem. The intertemporal distortion in
models with history-independent preferences is well understood. Diamond and Mirrlees (1978),
Rogerson (1985) and, in a more general framework, Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski
(2003) show that there is a positive intertemporal wedge in such models: At optimal contracts,
the principal’s rate of return to saving exceeds the shadow rate of return associated with the
agent’s consumption scheme.4
This subsection characterizes the intertemporal wedge for preferences that are history-
dependent. Recall that Ei[ ] denotes expectations conditional on ﬁrst-period information x1(i),
i.e., with respect to probability weights πj(e2(i)). Similarly, covi( ,  ) represents covariances
with respect to πj(e2(i)).
Consider the diﬀerence between P’s rate of return to saving and A’s shadow rate of return,
R2 −
u′
1(w1(i)) + βEi [∂c1u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))]
βEi [∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))]
. (10)
It is convenient to divide this diﬀerence by P’s rate of return, R2, and deﬁne the intertemporal
4The shadow rate of return is deﬁned as the rate at which the agent does not wish to save or borrow.
9wedge (given output x1(i)) as
IWi := 1 −
u′
1(w1(i)) + βEi [∂c1u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))]
βR2Ei [∂c2u2(w2(i,j),w1(i))]
. (11)
The intertemporal wedge is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2. Consider an optimal contract. Then, conditional on ﬁrst-period output x1(i),
the intertemporal wedge equals
IWi = 1 −
R2 − covi
 
∂c1u2, (∂c2u2)−1 
R2 − R2 covi
 
∂c2u2, (∂c2u2)−1 . (12)
Hence, the intertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
covi
 
R2∂c2u2 − ∂c1u2,
1
∂c2u2
 
< 0. (13)
Proof. Solve the ﬁrst-order condition (1) for u′
1 to get
u′
1 = β
R2 − Ei[∂c1u2 (∂c2u2)−1]
Ei[(∂c2u2)−1]
. (14)
Using
Ei[∂c1u2 (∂c2u2)−1] = covi
 
∂c1u2, (∂c2u2)−1 
+ Ei[∂c1u2]Ei[(∂c2u2)−1], (15)
we ﬁnd
u′
1 = β
R2 − covi
 
∂c1u2, (∂c2u2)−1 
Ei[(∂c2u2)−1]
− βEi[∂c1u2]. (16)
Substitute this into deﬁnition (11) to obtain
IWi = 1 −
R2 − covi
 
∂c1u2, (∂c2u2)−1 
R2Ei [∂c2u2]Ei[(∂c2u2)−1]
. (17)
Now the result follows from
Ei[∂c2u2]Ei[(∂c2u2)−1] = 1 − covi
 
∂c2u2, (∂c2u2)−1 
. (18)
10Proposition 2 proves that the sign of the intertemporal wedge coincides with the sign of the
negated covariance
− covi
 
R2∂c2u2 − ∂c1u2,
1
∂c2u2
 
. (19)
Intuitively, this expression captures the hypothetical impact of saving on incentives: The ﬁrst
variable in the covariance, R2∂c2u2 − ∂c1u2, is A’s marginal beneﬁt of saving. This beneﬁt
consists of the marginal payoﬀ of saving, R2∂c2u2, plus the marginal utility of reducing the
habit level, −∂c1u2.5 The second variable, (∂c2u2)−1, is monotonic in A’s second-period wage.
If these two variables covary negatively, then saving tends to increase A’s utility in the states
with low wages relative to the states with high wages. In other words, saving “hedges” against
incentives, or “tightens” the incentive compatibility constraint.
Simply put, Proposition 2 thus shows that the intertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
saving “hedges” against the incentive scheme. This insight extends the intuition from Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) to the case of history-dependent preferences. Their explana-
tion for the emergence of a positive intertemporal wedge, given history-independent preferences,
is that saving has an adverse eﬀect on incentives (Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski 2003,
p.577). For this reason, the social cost of saving is higher than the agent’s individual cost. It is
optimal to equate the social marginal cost and beneﬁt of saving, but not the agent’s individual
marginal cost and beneﬁt. Therefore, at optimal contracts, the agent’s individual marginal
beneﬁt of saving exceeds the agent’s individual marginal cost.
In the present setup, the intertemporal wedge can be negative as the next proposition shows.
However, a rather weak assumption guarantees that the wedge is positive. To formulate the
assumption, deﬁne the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution as
MRS(c1,c2) :=
u′
1(c1) + β∂c1u2(c2,c1)
β∂c2u2(c2,c1)
. (20)
Proposition 3. Let (w,e) be optimal. Let the ﬁrst-period output be x1(i) and suppose w2(i,j)  =
w2(i,j′) for some j,j′.6 Then we have the following. (i) The intertemporal wedge is not pos-
itive in general. (ii) The intertemporal wedge is positive if A’s marginal rate of intertemporal
5The agent’s marginal cost of saving, u
′
1, does not show up here, because it is independent of the realization
of second-period output.
6The case with w2(i,j) = w2(i,j
′) for all j,j
′ is not interesting. It corresponds to the implementation of
minimal eﬀort.
11substitution is increasing in second-period consumption.
Proof. (i) See Example 2 on page 19.
(ii) The intertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
βR2Ei [∂c2u2] −
 
u′
1 + βEi [∂c1u2]
 
> 0. (21)
This is the case if and only if
Ei
 
∂c2u2
 
R2 −
u′
1 + β∂c1u2
β∂c2u2
  
> 0. (22)
Proposition 1 implies that the random variable
R2 −
u′
1 + β∂c1u2
β∂c2u2
(23)
is centered. Hence, equation (22) can be rewritten as
covi
 
∂c2u2, R2 −
u′
1 + β∂c1u2
β∂c2u2
 
> 0. (24)
This is equivalent to
covi
 
∂c2u2,
u′
1 + β∂c1u2
β∂c2u2
 
< 0. (25)
By concavity of u2, the partial derivative ∂c2u2 is decreasing in second-period consumption.
By assumption, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is increasing in second-period
consumption. This implies that condition (25) is satisﬁed.
To understand the ﬁrst part of Proposition 3, suppose that consumption and habit are
substitutes for A’s second-period utility. That is, suppose ∂c1∂c2u2(c2,c1) < 0 for all c1,c2.
In this case, the hypothetical “hedging value” of saving captured by (19) is ambiguous. On
the one hand, the marginal payoﬀ of saving, R2∂c2u2, is due to concavity high whenever the
second-period wage is low. On the other hand, the marginal utility of reducing the habit level,
−∂c1u2, is low whenever the second-period wage is low. Hence, the “hedging value” of saving
can be positive or negative, depending on which eﬀect dominates. Therefore the intertemporal
wedge can go both ways.
12The second part of Proposition 3 shows that the above case is not generic. Under the
assumption that A’s willingness to give up future consumption for current consumption increases
in the level of future consumption, the intertemporal wedge is positive. This identiﬁes the key
factor in Rogerson’s (1985) result. It is not history-independent utility, but the variation of
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution that matters for the sign of the intertemporal
wedge.
The next section studies two speciﬁc forms of history-dependent preferences. For additive
habit formation, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution increases in future consump-
tion. For multiplicative habits, consumption and habit can be substitutes and the latter property
does not generally hold. As a consequence, the intertemporal wedge may be negative in that
setup.
4 Additive and multiplicative habit formation
In this section, I explore the two most common models of history-dependent consumption pref-
erences: additive and multiplicative habit formation.7 Among many others, Constantinides
(1990), Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) follow the ﬁrst approach.
Prominent examples of the multiplicative approach are Abel (1990) and Carroll, Overland, and
Weil (1997, 2000).
Both speciﬁcations impose two additional conditions to the agent’s preferences: Utility in
the second period is decreasing in ﬁrst-period consumption. Secondly, the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution decreases as habits become more important.8 Notice, however, that
the results derived in the previous section did not rely on any of these two properties.
7As in the previous section, the form of the eﬀort disutility functions does not play a role for the questions
addressed here.
8For multiplicative habits, there is a range of the consumption space in which this property is violated
(Wendner 2003). I will only consider cases where the contracts do not fall into this range.
134.1 Additive habits
Let u : R+ → R be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0 u′(c) = ∞.
Set
u1(c1) : = u(c1),
u2(c2,c1) : = u(˜ c2), ˜ c2 := c2 − γc1.
(26)
Equivalently, we can write ˜ c2 = (1 − γ)c2 + γ(c2 − c1). Hence, eﬀective consumption in
period 2 is a weighted average of absolute consumption, c2, and absolute consumption minus
the habit level, c2 −c1. The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] controls the importance of habits: The higher
the value of γ, the more the agent cares about how period 2 consumption relates to period 1
consumption.
The ﬁrst important ﬁnding is that Rogerson’s (1985) insight on intertemporal wedges extends
to this setup.
Proposition 4. Let A’s preferences be given by (26), let (w,e) be an optimal contract and
suppose that for each i there exist j,j′ such that w2(i,j)  = w2(i,j′). Then the intertemporal
wedge is positive.
Proof. Note MRS(c1,c2) = u′(c1)/(βu′(c2−γc1))−γ. This shows that MRS(c1,c2) is increasing
in c2. Hence, the intertemporal wedge is positive by Proposition 3.
The remainder of this subsection discusses the comparative statics of optimal wage proﬁles
in the habit parameter. For history-independent preferences, the intertemporal slope of wages is
determined by the curvature of inverse marginal utility as Rogerson (1985) has shown. If inverse
marginal utility is convex, then expected wages are nonincreasing over time. This convexity
requirement is satisﬁed in many generic cases, for instance for CRRA utility with a coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion larger than one.
If the agent forms habits, then the intertemporal slope of wages does not only depend on
the curvature of inverse marginal utility, but also on the importance of habits. This tends to
shift wages to the end of the relationship as we will see now.
For logarithmic utility, the functional relation between the slope of wages and the habit
parameter γ is particularly simple.
14Example 1. Let u(c) = log(c), βR2 = 1. Then equation (1), the condition for intertemporal
optimality of rewards, takes the form
Ei
 
1
u′( ˜ w2(i,j))
 
=
1
u′(w1(i))
(1 + βγ), (27)
which implies
Ei[w2(i,j)]
w1(i)
= 1 + (1 + β)γ. (28)
Thus, expected wages are constant over time if the agent does not form habits (γ = 0). If he
does form habits (γ > 0), then expected wages are increasing over time. Moreover, the ratio
between expected wages paid in period 2 and period 1 is increasing in the habit parameter γ.
In the above example, expected wages are increasing over time for any positive habit pa-
rameter. More generally, no matter what utility function is chosen, expected wages will increase
over time if the habit parameter is suﬃciently large, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5. Let γ = 1. If (w,e) is an optimal contract, then w2(i,j) > w1(i) for all i,j.
Proof. For γ = 1, second-period utility takes the form u2(w2(i,j),w1(i)) = u(w2(i,j) − w1(i)).
Therefore, the statement follows immediately from the assumption limc→0 u′(c) = ∞.
The ratio between expected wages at date 2 and date 1 is a monotonic function of the
habit parameter γ in the log-utility example. This result can be generalized. However, for
non-logarithmic utility, the intertemporal condition (1) cannot be solved for wage levels. The
shape of wages can only be studied if one includes the incentive and participation constraint
in the analysis. To keep things tractable, I study the simplest possible case: two eﬀort levels,
{l,h}, and two outputs, {xL,xH}, xL < xH. Probability distributions satisfy πH(l) < πH(h),
and eﬀort costs are v1(l) = v2(l) = 0, v1(h) = v2(h) = v > 0. To simplify notation, write
wi = w1(i), wij = w2(i,j) and set v′ := v/(πH(h) − πH(l)).
Suppose P wants to implement eﬀort h in both periods (i.e., xH − xL is suﬃciently large).
15Then optimal contracts are characterized as follows:
1 + γ/R2
u′(wH)
− πH(h)
1
βR2u′(wHH − γwH)
− (1 − πH(h))
1
βR2u′(wHL − γwH)
= 0 (29)
1 + γ/R2
u′(wL)
− πH(h)
1
βR2u′(wLH − γwL)
− (1 − πH(h))
1
βR2u′(wLL − γwL)
= 0 (30)
u(wHH − γwH) − u(wHL − γwH) − v′ = 0 (31)
u(wLH − γwL) − u(wLL − γwL) − v′ = 0 (32)
u(wH) + u(wHL − γwH) + (1 + β)v′πH(l) − v′ − U = 0 (33)
u(wL) + u(wLL − γwL) + (1 + β)v′πH(l) − U = 0. (34)
Here, (29),(30) are the intertemporal optimality conditions, (31),(32) ensure incentive compati-
bility of second-period eﬀort, (33),(34) ensure incentive compatibility of ﬁrst-period eﬀort, and
together with (31),(32) also imply that the participation constraint is satisﬁed.
This system of six equations can be separated into two subsystems with three equations
each—one system determining wH,wHL,wHH, and one determining wL,wLL,wLH. The com-
parative statics in the habit parameter γ are as follows.
Proposition 6. Let (w,e) be the optimal contract in the two-eﬀort two-output model described
above. Then for each i,j, the ratio w2(i,j)/w1(i) is increasing in γ.
Proof. Let i = H. (The case i = L is exactly analogous.) Applying the implicit function
theorem to the system of equations (29),(31),(33) yields
∂wH
∂γ
= −
β2
D
u′(wH)u′( ˜ wHL)3u′( ˜ wHH)3
∂wHH
∂γ
= wH +
β
D
u′(wH)u′( ˜ wHL)3u′( ˜ wHH)2[u′(wH) − γβu′( ˜ wHH)]
∂wHL
∂γ
= wH +
β
D
u′(wH)u′( ˜ wHL)2u′( ˜ wHH)3[u′(wH) − γβu′( ˜ wHL)],
where
D = −(1 − pH(h))u′(wH)3u′( ˜ wHH)3u′′( ˜ wHL)
− u′( ˜ wHL)3[(R2 + γ)β2u′( ˜ wHH)3u′′(wH) + pH(h)u′(wH)3u′′( ˜ wHH)]
> 0.
16Hence, the expression ∂wHH
∂γ wH − wHH
∂wH
∂γ is equal to
w2
H +
β
D
u′(wH)u′( ˜ wHL)3u′( ˜ wHH)2  
wHu′(wH) + β ˜ wHHu′( ˜ wHH)
 
,
which is positive. This shows that the ratio wHH/wH is increasing in γ. Monotonicity of
wHL/wH can be seen analogously.
The intuition underlying Proposition 6 is straightforward. If the habit parameter γ increases,
A demands a higher compensation for the “comparison eﬀects” generated by date 1 wages. This
makes wages paid at date 1 more costly relative to wages paid at date 2, hence P substitutes.
4.2 Multiplicative habits
Let u : R+ → R be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0 u′(c) = ∞.
Let γ ∈ [0,1], b > 0. Set
u1(c1) : = u(c1),
u2(c2,c1) : = u(ˆ c2), ˆ c2 := c2/(b + c1)γ.
(35)
Eﬀective consumption in period 2 can be rewritten ˆ c2 = c
1−γ
2 (c2/(b + c1))γ. That is, eﬀective
consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of absolute consumption, c2, and absolute consump-
tion relative to the habit level, c2/(b+c1). The parameter γ is the weight attached to the latter
term. For an agent with a higher value of γ, the comparison between date 2 consumption and
date 1 consumption thus gets more important in this sense.
The introduction of b > 0 in the habit term is a technical necessity for this speciﬁcation.
Note that for b = 0 one obtains
u′(c1) + β∂c1u2(c2,c1) = u′(c1) − βγc
−γ−1
1 c2u′(ˆ c2). (36)
Hence, in this case the assumption u′(0) = ∞ is no longer suﬃcient for the condition
∀c2 > 0 lim
c1→0
 
u′(c1) + β∂c1u2(c2,c1)
 
= ∞, (37)
which is needed to make sure that solutions are interior. For b > 0, this problem does not arise.
17The next proposition is the main result of this subsection. It shows that multiplicative
habits change the key insight of Rogerson’s (1985) time-separable model. The intertemporal
wedge is not generally positive.
Proposition 7. Let A’s preferences be given by (35), let (w,e) be an optimal contract and
suppose that for each i there exist j,j′ such that w2(i,j)  = w2(i,j′). Then we have the following.
(i) The intertemporal wedge is not positive in general.
(ii) The intertemporal wedge is positive if A’s coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion, −ˆ c2
u′′(ˆ c2)
u′(ˆ c2) , is
bounded below by 1.
Proof. (i) See Example 2 on page 19.
(ii) The assumption −ˆ c2
u′′(ˆ c2)
u′(ˆ c2) ≥ 1 is equivalent to
− u′(c2(b + c1)−γ) − c2(b + c1)−γu′′(c2(b + c1)−γ) ≥ 0. (38)
Multipliying this by γ(b + c1)−1−γ, we have
− γ(b + c1)−1−γu′(c2(b + c1)−γ) − c2γ(b + c1)−1−2γu′′(c2(b + c1)−γ) ≥ 0, (39)
which is equivalent to ∂c1∂c2u2 ≥ 0. In combination with ∂c2∂c2u2 < 0, this implies that
MRS(c1,c2) is increasing in c2. Hence, the intertemporal wedge is positive by Proposition
3.
The reason why the intertemporal wedge is not generally positive has already been pointed
out at the end of Section 3.2: While A’s marginal beneﬁt of saving covaries negatively with future
wages in the time-separable model, this is no longer the case for the model with multiplicative
habits. If consumption and habit are substitutes, which happens exactly when the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion is smaller than one, then the covariance may be positive. In this case,
saving would strengthen the link between A’s utility and future wages, opposite to the time-
separable model.
To prove the ﬁrst part of Proposition 7, I now study an example in which the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion is smaller than one. Note that for multiplicative habits optimal contracts
can only be determined numerically (except for logarithmic utility).
18Example 2. Consider the two-eﬀort two-output problem described in the previous subsection.
The optimal contract can be easily characterized by a system of equations analogous to the
system (29)–(34) for additive habits. Assume R2 = β = 1, u(c) = 1
1−ρc1−ρ, ρ = 0.4, b = 0.3,
v = 0.1, πH(l) = 0.25, πH(h) = 0.5, U = 2.
Table 1 depicts optimal wages for diﬀerent values of the habit parameter γ. Figures 1 and 2
display wages graphically. We see that ﬁrst-period wages w1(i) decrease in the habit parameter
γ, whereas second-period eﬀective wages ˆ w2(i,j) increase in γ.
Figure 3 shows the intertemporal wedge for each output realization of period 1, x1(i) ∈
{xL,xH}. For γ = 0, preferences are history-independent and thus the intertemporal wedge is
positive, of course. The wedge declines in γ, and eventually becomes negative. Hence, there
is a cutoﬀ value of γ, below of which the intertemporal wedge is positive for both ﬁrst-period
output realizations, and above of which the intertemporal wedge is negative for at least one
output realization. Deﬁne γ∗ as this cutoﬀ value. In summary, we have the following.
Observation 1. The intertemporal wedge decreases in γ and can become negative (Figure 3).
The intuition is as follows. Since ρ < 1, the marginal habit eﬀect of saving, −∂c1u2 =
γ(b + c1)γ(ρ−1)−1c
1−ρ
2 , is increasing in second-period consumption c2. If γ is suﬃciently large,
this will outweigh the negative relation between the marginal payoﬀ of saving, R2∂c2u2 =
(b + c1)γ(ρ−1)c
−ρ
2 , and second-period consumption. In that case, A’s marginal beneﬁt of sav-
ing, R2∂c2u2 − ∂c1u2, will covary positively with second-period wages, hence the hypothetical
“hedging value” of saving will be negative.
The size of the covariance between the marginal payoﬀ of saving and second-period wages
depends crucially on A’s risk aversion. The above discussion points out that the habit eﬀect
of saving will dominate the wealth eﬀect if the coeﬃcient ρ of relative risk aversion is small.
This suggests that for small values of ρ, a relatively small habit parameter γ will suﬃce to
make the intertemporal wedge negative. Figure 4 shows the cutoﬀ value γ∗, above of which the
intertemporal wedge is negative for at least one realization of ﬁrst-period output, for varying
coeﬃcients ρ of relative risk aversion. Indeed we see the following.
Observation 2. The cutoﬀ value γ∗ decreases as ρ gets smaller. Moreover, γ∗ approaches zero
as ρ goes to zero. (Figure 4)
19γ w1(H) ˆ w2(H,H) ˆ w2(H,L) w1(L) ˆ w2(L,H) ˆ w2(L,L)
0 0.57615 0.75031 0.42881 0.42444 0.58109 0.29632
0.1 0.50713 0.83061 0.49353 0.36826 0.63594 0.34152
0.2 0.40427 0.96563 0.60437 0.29368 0.72352 0.41315
0.3 0.24524 1.22542 0.82304 0.19830 0.87988 0.53872
0.4 0.10551 1.54966 1.10302 0.10978 1.09680 0.71313
0.5 0.05256 1.72965 1.26090 0.06041 1.24748 0.83940
0.6 0.03091 1.82740 1.34723 0.03648 1.33626 0.91567
0.7 0.02001 1.88827 1.40119 0.02380 1.39268 0.96471
0.8 0.01377 1.92978 1.43806 0.01638 1.43138 0.99855
0.9 0.00988 1.95983 1.46479 0.01171 1.45945 1.02320
1 0.00730 1.98254 1.48501 0.00861 1.48068 1.04189
Table 1: Optimal (eﬀective) wages for diﬀerent values of the habit parameter γ
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Figure 1: (Eﬀective) wages, given high output in period 1
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Figure 2: (Eﬀective) wages, given low output in period 1
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Figure 3: Intertemporal wedge for high and low output in period 1. The wedges are negative if
the habit parameter is suﬃciently large.
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Figure 4: Maximum value of the habit parameter for which both intertemporal wedges are
positive. This value is increasing in the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ρ.
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Figure 5: Maximum value of the habit parameter for which both intertemporal wedges are
positive. This value is increasing in the intercept of the habit process, b.
22In other words, Figure 4 shows that the intertemporal wedge is negative if the habit pa-
rameter γ is suﬃciently large compared to the coeﬃcient ρ of relative risk aversion. Finally, we
note the following.
Observation 3. There exist coeﬃcients ρ < 1 with γ∗ = 1 (Figure 4).
Hence, the highest possible habit parameter (γ = 1) does not for all risk aversion coeﬃcients
ρ < 1 lead to negative intertemporal wedges. As Figure 5 shows, the set of parameters with
negative intertemporal wedges can be increased by decreasing the size of the constant b. This
seems due to the fact that b has a dampening eﬀect on changes in the habit level: The larger
the size of b, the smaller is the relative change of the habit level b + c1 given a reduction of
consumption c1 by one unit.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper introduces history-dependent preferences into the principal-agent framework. The
paper shows how the Inverse Euler equation must be modiﬁed to account for eﬀects of current
wages on future preferences. Moreover, the paper characterizes the intertemporal wedge. The
key condition to obtain a positive wedge is that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
increases in future consumption. This identiﬁes the driving force of the results by Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978), Rogerson (1985), and Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003).
The results in this paper characterize the eﬃcient way to induce a given eﬀort proﬁle. For
this question, history-dependence of consumption preferences is the only relevant diﬀerence to
the standard model. A complementary and also very interesting question is what eﬀort proﬁle
the principal wants to implement. In that context, history-dependence of eﬀort preferences will
make an important diﬀerence. However, the latter question cannot be addressed in the general
environment used in this paper. One has to think about concrete applications of moral hazard
problems and tailor models to those applications. Moreover, one needs a better understanding
of how previous eﬀort choices may inﬂuence people’s current preferences to work hard. This
creates interesting directions for future research.
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